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Reviews
The Legal Point of View. By Robert A. Samek. New York:
Philosophical Library. 1974. Pp. 403. ($15.00).
What is Law? By what criteria do we recognize valid law? These
questions have exercised the minds of distinguished jurisprudential
thinkers of the past. Every solution that has been propounded,
whether in terms of natural law theory, command models, norm or
rule models, seems to have been defective in one way or another.
The main thesis of this book is that every attempt to find some
"essence of law" - whether in terms of commands, rules or
whatever - is bound to fail. The reason given is that there is not
one and only one "true" conception of law. There are different
perspectives from which law and near-law can be usefully treated.
What is a useful paradigm for lawyers dealing with a sophisticated
legal system may not be useful for the anthropologist. The
standpoints of the "bad man," of the counselling lawyer, of the
judge, and of the legislator, all reflect different slants on legal
phenomena. When we look at law from a philosophical standpoint it
becomes clear, in the author's view, that our determinations as to
what is law will be based on evaluative models. We may think, as
Kelsen did, that legal phenomena can be the object of a value-free
science, but if so we are deluded, Samek contends. "Although we
can point to instances of legal systems and of individual laws in the
world, we can do so only in virtue of a scheme of interpretation of a
certain range of phenomena which we have defined explicitly or
implicitly by means of an evaluative model'! [p. 89]. Rather than
attempt to find some "essence of law," then, Samek suggests that
legal philosophers approach the study of law through use of
explicitly evaluative models. Models should themselves be
evaluated not according to whether they are "true" or not, but
whether or not they are fruitful. The notion of "fruitfulness" is
appealed to repeatedly throughout this work.
A large part of the book is devoted to examining and criticizing
the older models. There are lengthy summaries, with critical
commentary, of the views of Hobbes, Bentham, Austin, Kelsen,
Hart and Fuller, as well as some treatment of Backstone, Morris,
Dworkin, Pound and Summers. One problem with this format is
that the author's argument tends to get submerged in expository
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material. He defends his method by saying that his new organizing
concept of "the legal point of view" will be "largely constructed
with the building blocks of the old models" [p. xvi] and that "in
meshing my own ideas with what has gone before, the idiosyncrasy
of my position can at least be judged against a broader canvas and a
deeper perspective than it alone could provide" [p. xvii]. But the
effect of this method is to place a considerable burden upon a reader
trying to get a composite view of Samek's positive contributions.
The studies, particularly of Bentham, Kelsen and Hart, are
meritorious in their own right, however, and will be of interest to
persons engaged in studying those authors. Space would not permit
both a detailed evaluation of his treatment of these authors and an
examination of the foundations of his own proposals. In this review
I shall confine myself mainly to the latter.
The philosophical presuppositions of this book are subjectivist,
relativist and pragmatic. 1 Samek does not believe evaluative
judgements express truths or falsities. That he is a verificationist I
conclude from statements such as the following: "Models of points
of view can only be evaluative models; they cannot be assertive
models, since they are not verifiable" [p. 40]. Given his
meta-ethical affinity with Kelsen, it is interesting to see how his
approach differs from the latter's. In contrast to Kelsen, he is not
disturbed at the idea of admitting evaluative components to the
study of law. One reason is that he thinks Kelsen does not succeed
in providing a value-free theory of law. The attempt breaks down at
the level of the "basic norm," supposedly an objective, logical
requirement, but concerning which Samek says "the logical
necessity of this presupposition is by no means self-evident. Indeed,
it strikes one intuitively as unnecessary" [p. 181]. Furthermore,
Samek does not go along with the shift in focus whereby Kelsen,
having determined that a norm system is effective, concentrates on
the basic norm as the reason for the validity of a norm system.
"Kelsen is at great pains to distinguish the reason for the validity of
a norm system, that is, the basic norm, from the condition of its
effectiveness; but since the former merely rubberstamps the fait
1. There is perennial confusion surrounding use of the word "subjectivist." One
usage that is not implied here is that according to which ethical utterances are
reports of one's evaluative feelings. Clearly, if as a psychological report on how I
feel. Analogous considerations apply regarding interpretation of the term
"relativist." In philosophical jargon, one would label Samek a "non-cognitivist,"
a general term which could apply either an "emotivist" or a "prescriptivist."
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accompli constituted by the latter, it is a distinction without a
difference" [p. 187].
A second reason is that Samek, in keeping with other modern
subjectivists, has lots of room for the use of reason in constructing,
defending and recommending value judgements. Thus Samek says
"although evaluative models and expressions are incurably
subjective, it does not follow that no rational choice is possible
between evaluative standards acceptable as appropriate to one body
of informed opinion and those acceptable to another" [p. 51].
Drawing on some ideas of Richard Taylor, he maintains that value
judgements can be both validated and vindicated:
Validation is a method of evaluating the rational pedigree of an
evaluative standard in depth. Vindication supplements the
yardstick of depth by the yardstick of breadth. Man has not just
one end, but many, and if they are all to be realized they must be
practically consistent with each other, that is, they must not get
in each others' way. Hence what a person has to show in order to
vindicate his adoption of an evaluative model, or his use of an
evaluative expression, is not merely that they serve a particular
end which he seeks to realize; he must also show that this end fits
into a consistent set of ends. As a person becomes more
conscious of the rational connection between his various ends, he
may be said to commit himself to a way of life [p. 51].
A third and more fundamental reason for departing from Kelsen's
quest for a "pure science" emerges when we consider Samek's
early discussion of Wittgenstein. One of the upshots of that
discussion is that "it is impossible to define the essence of anything
in an absolute sense" [p. 13]. Furthermore, "there is no sharp line
which divides ordinary concepts from model concepts, and all
concepts are open textured to some extent" [p. 14]. Now it is
possible that I am misinterpreting Samek, but I take him to be
implying something like this: if all concepts, scientific, ethical or
otherwise, take on different meanings according to the different
purposes for which they are used, and are "subservient" [p. 13] to
those purposes, it would seem difficult if not impossible to be
completely free of subjectivity. Even where facts appear to
correspond perfectly with a scientific assertion, it can be argued that
"the facts" are construed on the basis of an evaluative model.
Clearly, if the goal of absolute objectivity can never be fully
realized in any sphere, it seems pointless to press for such a goal
regarding law.
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The reason I hesitate somewhat in ascribing the above views to
Samek, is that he seems perfectly confident to talk about truth and
objectivity regarding scientific assertions. He does distinguish
between the scientific point of view and the point of view of
philosophy of science and perhaps would admit that evaluations
entered in from the latter perspective. But if so, it might be asked,
do such evaluations not colour the concepts adopted from the
scientific point of view as well? Here a problem of consistency
arises: for Samek seems prepared to allow that evaluations made at
the legal-philosophical level colour contentions made from the legal
point of view - in other words, that judgements made from the
legal point of view are not value-free. Should he not also be
prepared to make the same judgement concerning science? I do not
get a clear answer concerning Samek's position. It is open to him to
argue that the scientific point of view differs in that it eschews the
valuations of the philosophical-scientific standpoint, whereas the
legal point of view admits some of the valuations of the
legal-philosophical standpoint. I simply do not know what his
answer is, but whatever it is, it would be helpful for clarifying the
ideas in this book.
Points of View: Samek stipulates that a "point of view" marks
out an exclusive field of interest, and that "consequently, points of
view are mutually exclusive" [p. 38]. I use the word "stipulates"
advisedly, since it is not clear to me that the notion "point of view"
as I understand it necessarily excludes other points of view. He
objects to Richard Taylor's inclusion of only partly normative
elements into the normative point of view on the ground that this
undermines the distinction between normative and non-normative
points of view; he also objects to Taylor's contention that some
points of view, such as the moral and political points of view, may
overlap. Samek thinks the latter admission erodes the distinction
between points of view. His reason is that the rules of relevance
which Taylor attaches to given points of view would "hardly have
sufficient binding force to give them concrete shape" [p. 38]. Here
Samek seems to me to need more argument and elucidation,
particularly in light of the importance he attaches to the
impossibility of inconsistency between different points of view.
A concept which is used from a point of view is "bent by that
point of view in the direction of a field of interest marked out by it,"
and "similarly. . .a model is bent by the point of view of which it is
constructed" [p. 38]. Samek also holds that "points of view are not
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linked with, or limited to, any particular functions of discourse"

[p.

3 8 ].

So far, it would appear as if the notion of "point of view" is an
evaluative notion. But we must be careful to distinguish, Samek
says, between models of points of view, which are evaluative, and
models constructed from points of view, which may be assertive
and verifiable [p. 40]. "Strictly speaking," he says, "it is an
understanding, or an evaluative model of a point of view, and not
the point of view itself, that marks out a field of interest" [p. 39].
This evaluative model of a point of view he calls a second-order or
meta-model.
Samek's meaning here is not entirely clear to me. Certainly there
is a difference between evaluatively mapping a field to be
designated "legal point of view" and, having accepted that field,
making assertions about occurrences within it. We might adopt, for
example, an extended form of the command model and they be led
to treat a father's command to his son as a kind of "law."
Accepting the framework of the command model the contention that
the father has expressed a law takes an assertive form. But is it
genuinely assertive, or assertive in form only? One can verify that
the father gave the command and therefore, given the evaluative
framework, that he expressed a law. But the assertion "he
expressed a law" still carries with it the evaluative framework of the
command model, and one who rejects that framework may equally
want to reject the description of the father's command as "law."
Exactly how the models constructedfrom points of view can escape
being to some extent also evaluative is what Samek does not make
plain. In fact, it is often very difficult to know when he is talking of
a model and when of a meta-model. It is not surprising that he
should feel it necessary to remind us that he has been talking about
"the legal point of view, or more accurately. . .my evaluative
model of it" [p. 337].
The danger attaching to confusion of meta-models with models is
that a "point of view" not identified as one or the other can be used
in one guise to reject the models of others (evaluatively), and in
another guise to set out its own "essence-of-law" model (the
evaluative side being played down). Samek criticizes both Austin
and Kelsen for trying to "have it both ways": that is, for appealing
to some factual condition for legal validity and yet denying that it is
the source of the validity. I sometimes wonder whether Samek, too,
may not be "trying to have it both ways" stressing now the
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subjectivity of all legal models, including his own, and at other
times speaking as if he had, after all, something like an
"essence-of-law" model, only superior to others. To say that this or
that legal point of view is more "fruitful" and therefore should be
adopted, may just be trading old essences for new. What is "law"
perhaps becomes essentially that which will bear the particular
kind of fruit sought, or the different kinds of fruit which
different people seek for their own particular purposes. Since
Samek never investigates the notion of "fruitfulness" at any
length, such an interpretation, or misinterpretation, is an everlurking possibility.
As indicated above, Samek treats "points of view" as mutually
exclusive and (hence) such that they cannot contradict each other.
Since he has stipulatively defined "points of view" to be mutually
exclusive the question to ask is not whether he is right or wrong to
say they have this property, but whether any things corresponding to
his definition can be found. Are there any "points of view" in his
sense? If everything which we would recognize to be a point of view
fails to have the feature of never contradicting another point of view
we may well conclude that there are none. Let us examine a few
cases, to see how things stand. We might conceive of cases where
we would want to say that someone is "from a legal point of view,
guilty of murder," but "morally speaking, perfectly innocent."
Here, as Samek suggests, the concept "murderer" gets "bent"
according to whether we adopt the legal or moral point of view.
There is no contradiction. But consider another example, suggested
by Lord Gardiner's bill before the English Commons recently, the
Rehabilitation of Offenders Bill. This provides that after so many
years a person convicted of one among certain classes of crimes
may, if he has "gone straight" during those years and "lived
down" his offence (i.e. has not been convicted of another offence),
deny that he was ever convicted at all. Suppose that in a typical
case, precisely of the kind envisaged by the Bill, a person fitting the
description avails himself of the enacted bill's provisions in a
courtroom setting. Could we say, without contradiction, that
"legally speaking there was no lie, but morally speaking there was a
lie?" The notion of lying is tied to misuse of speech conventions,
with a view to deceiving; it is not tied merely to verbal falsehoods.
The law would have great weight in re-casting the conventions, so
that there could be genuine doubt as to whether the person could
properly be said to be "morally speaking, a liar."
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Without resorting to elaborate examples, we can question also
whether a murder that is paradigmatic from the legal point of view
- that is, where no plea can possibly be sustained in defence, as in
an out-and-out case of wanton slaughter, in full view of witnesses,
the killer perfectly sane, and so forth - could be intelligibly viewed
as possibly not murder "from a moral point of view"? One can
conceive of cases where it would seem absurd to say "it was murder
from a legal point of view but not from the moral point of view."
Yet if points of view are exclusive in the sense Samek holds, such a
statement must always be non-self-contradictory.
It is interesting in this regard that Samek himself regards the legal
point of view as including morality as a component, although he
claims it is "bent" in the legal direction.
The Legal Point of View: Samek's own evaluative working model
purports not to give us the "essence of law" but rather to demarcate
a "field of interest" [p. 87]. The field of interest is "that mode of
institutional social control which it enforces through the effective
application of a norm-system by courts or tribunals acting as
norm-authorities of the system" [p. 87]. The content of the norms
"is adapted for the purpose of that social control from a range of
values drawn from different points of view, and in particular from
the moral point of view which provides the foundation of values on
which a legal norm-system is based" [p. 87]. A norm must be
impersonal, and the norm-subject must be different from the
norm-authority [p. 56]. A norm which has the character of an
obligation is action-committing, and a norm which has the character
of a permission is action-guiding, "and I shall distinguish between a
weak and a strong permission as follows: a permission in the weak
sense is action-guiding in the minimal sense that it advises the
subject that there are no obligation norms which explicitly cover the
act in question. . .A permission in the strong sense is actionguiding in the positive sense that it advises the subject that he has
the option of doing or forbearing from doing the act in question"
[p. 62].
A necessary condition for there being a legal norm-system is that
it be effectively enforced. Samek considers a system effectively
enforced if its "machinery is effective for most of the norm-subjects
on most occasions" [p. 89]. This norm model "relates individual
laws to a hierarchical system on the philosophical analogy of the
relations of norms to a norm system" [p. 94]. Every genuine norm
is eo ipso a valid norm, since it is by definition an atomic unit of a
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norm-system, that is, of an hierarchical system of impersonal
prescriptions, the issuing of the lower units of which is enjoined or
permitted by the higher" [p. 177].
On this account, legal validity has a "double aspect,. . namely
the aspect of conformity with a legal norm-system, and the aspect of
effective enforcement of this system" [p. 263]. Samek goes on to
assert that ". . .the validity of a given statute is not due to its
acceptance as valid by officials, and to the obedience of the people;
it is due to the fact that it is a postulate of an evaluative model that
statutes are valid sources of law, provided that they are effectively
enforced within the framework of a legal system" [p. 268].
This last statement calls for comment. It seems to make a claim
about what makes a statute valid. But the statement is made in the
context of a general denial that there can be any purely factual
criterion for legal validity. Samek claims that any seemingly factual
criterion will be found to relate to an evaluative model tacitly
underlying it. Hence I do not see how Samek, if he is consistent,
can mean precisely what he says above. To say that validity of a
given statute is derived from the fact that it is a postulate of a given
evaluative model is a purely factual criterion. What he must mean to
say is that the claim that a given statute is valid must be made within
the context of an evaluative model. If not, he would inconsistently
making an exception for his own criterion of validity, treating his
alone as providing an "essence of law."
Samek allows for a distinction between rules and standards within
his model. The former are treated as prescriptions, while the latter
are assertive or evaluative in nature. "An action-committing rule is
either obeyed or applied, or disobeyed or not applied; an
action-guiding rule is either followed, or not followed; a standard
may be more or less satisfied or met" [p. 284]. Standards may be
open or closed. The former require "considerable judgement" for
their application, for example, the standard of due care or
reasonableness. Closed standards, on the other hand, can be applied
mechanically - for example a speed limit of 30 m.p.h. "General
legal norms," he says, "lay down broad principles which are to be
used as open standardsby the norm-subjects" [p. 284].
From the legal point of view the decisive factor is the
"enforceability of the regulation by a court or tribunal (that
qualifies as a legal norm-authority) through the application of the
norms of a legal norm-system" [p. 299]. The legal point of view is
concerned with man's social aspect as such, Samek says. The moral
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point of view includes the social aspect but much more besides.
Legal obligation is distinguished from moral obligation in that each
is "bent" in the field of interest marked out by the relevant point of
view. The moral point of view is primarily concerned with
action-guiding aspirations and action-committing obligations. The
legal point of view is concerned primarily with action-committing
norms. "The concept of sanction is only indirectly relevant to the
former, but crucial to the latter" [p. 319].
We have seen that Samek has stipulated that there can be no
logical conflict between evaluative models of the legal and of the
moral point of view. It is also the case, he says, that no logical
conflict can exist between e'aluative models constructed from the
legal and from the moral point of view. "The so-called conflict
between law and morality is at bottom a problem of the overall
consistency of ends in adopting evaluative models of different
points of view, and evaluative models constructed from different
points of view" [p. 319]. Here there seems to me some problem as
to whether "consistency of ends" is sufficient. A group of thugs
bent on overthrowing legitimate government might, consistently
with -their selfish aim, adopt a succession of quite conflicting
evaluative models. If consistency of ends were all that mattered, we
would have to say that these different models were consistent. At
the heart of the matter is Samek's subjectivism. If legal models are
evaluative, then we cannot show that another's model, however out
of keeping with the views of the rest of mankind, is wrong. We can
only try to show how the proponent of the model is not being
consistent with his own fundamental values or commitment.
In the previous section I have summarized the bare bones of
Samek's model. To underscore the importance of each component
would require going over the treatment and criticism of the authors
Samek deals with. I shall limit myself to a few observations. One of
the main uses to which the model is put is to find a satisfactory
relationship between law and morality that will given recognition to
the sound points made on both sides of the Hart-Fuller debate. He
disagrees with the contention that law is morally neutral, or that a
model according to which law is viewed as morally neutral is a
better model. On the other hand, he recognizes, as we have seen, a
distinction in point of view between law and morality. His main
arguments are concentrated against the positivist side. People do not
understand by "law" something morally neutral, nor should they,
he suggests. "Its social utility and authority rest on the tacit
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presupposition that it accords with morality, that it makes no
demands which may prove morally repugnant to those to whom it
applies" [p. 334]. In this section of the book Samek goes further
than ever before in admitting morality as a component of the legal
point of view. Having carefully stressed earlier that morality gets
"bent" by the legal point of view, and that it loses the character of
the moral point of view, he says that "a judge must adopt the legal
point of view, yet he must never close the door on the moral point of
view -

and on other points of view -

or he will cease to be a judge

of the law and instead become its prisoner" [p. 320]. The problem
is intriguing, in that it is not clear how far that door should be open,
or whether Samek's proposal is a legal-evaluative one or a
moral-evaluative one, or perhaps both. We need to remind
ourselves of the mutual exclusivity claimed earlier for legal and
moral points of view. We might also ask whether a judge really
needs the moral point of view as such. Moral features are already
built into the law, as Samek recognized earlier. He gives few
examples and illustrations in the book, but I would think the
common law principle of interpretation expressed by Lord Kenyon
in Fowler v. Padget (1798)2 is one good example of a moral
component that has been grafted in the course of time onto the legal
point of view. Still, there must always be a first person to state such
principles, so perhaps Samek is right to ask that the door be kept
open to the moral point of view.
Applying his model to Fuller's notion of the "internal morality of
law," Samek concludes that to the extent that principles of good
legal craftsmanship represent moral values they do so from the
moral point of view and not essentially, while to the extent that they
represent legal values they do so from the legal point of view and
not essentially [p. 309]. He agrees, therefore, with Hart in
supposing that logically, at least, perfect "inner morality"
(procedural justice) is compatible with considerable external
immorality. I share Samek's view here. Fuller's notion that
iniquitous rules will be difficult to apply is not true of many
examples one can think of. Procedurally, there seemed to be little
difficulty in denying women the vote in the last century, however
unjust the practice.
Yet the alternative of treating law as morally purely neutral also
does not seem right. Perhaps one truth underlying the hostility to
2. 7 Term R. 509 at p. 514, 101 E.R. 1103.
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moral neutrality of law -

a hostility shared by Samek -

is that

although segments of the population may have moral objections to
certain kinds of legislation (for example some welfare legislation
and guaranteed annual incomes), they can accept and respect such
law on the understanding that the various powers that be have given
effect to those laws out of a genuine concern for the collective
well-being of society. Without beliefs in the general good intentions
of those in control of the legal system, the populace would be less
inclined to support it, and in the extreme case a police state would
be necessary to give effect to the laws. Thus I can agree with Samek
when he says that "if the authority of law were recognized without
regard to its moral foundations, if law were debased to a soulless
machine that could be used for any purpose, it could be turned
against the very morality that it aims to protect" [p. 334]. There is
surely room for accepting both the view that an individual statute
may have enough of the features of law to warrant being treated as
valid law, even though we think it immoral, and the view that the
paradigm of law has moral features built into it, so that it would be
misleading to treat the connection between law and morality as
purely contingent. Hume was not far off the mark when he supposed
that the legitimate moral partiality we feel to friends and relatives
and those for whom we have strong sympathy, would frequently
lead us to view a law as contrary to our moral sentiments. It is just
because of our partiality, among other things, that laws are needed
to distribute goods peacefully. There is a moral justification and
purpose for the laws, but also good reason for supposing conflict to
arise between law and moral sentiment.
Samek goes on to say that "it is only by means of its own internal
morality and not by means of an external standard of critism, that
law can be prevented from becoming an instrument of oppression"
[p. 334]. His reason is that, because of the autonomous aspect of the
moral point of view, "the result of separating law from morality is
to banish criticism of the law to the court of conscience of the
individual and of his immediate family" [p. 334]. Surely, though,
there are many instances where a well-argued autonomous moral
judgement has been influential in shaping the moral views of a
whole community. Furthermore, one might ask Samek whether
what one calls the "internal morality of law" ought not, on his own
principles, to be also a matter of one's own subjective, autonomous
value judgement. It is true that Samek goes on to say "according to
my model of the legal point of view, the only question is whether a
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legal system qualifies as a legal norm-system. If it does, it cannot be
invalid on moral grounds" [p. 335]. But it must be remembered that
(1) built into his model are certain features of morality and (2) he is
not claiming objectivity for his model. Someone else is at liberty to
put forward another model such that moral grounds could invalidate
the legal norm-system, if only such a model would be fruitful for his
purpose. (One may ask again here whether there is not a covert
appeal to objectivity in the notion "fruitful" or in the stipulation
that the model must be fruitful? Or whether the stipulation is merely
a higher-order subjective model of how people should go about
constructing models: that is, a higher-order model which itself,
being evaluative, is neither true nor false.).
Samek argues that his model has the advantage of enabling us "to
look at old problems and puzzles from a new vantage point close
enough to keep them in sight, yet sufficiently detached to give us
perspective. This not only has the therapeutic effect of dissolving
many apparently insoluble problems, but permits us to reinterpret
them in a positive manner" [p. 339]. Yet we need to know whether
the new problems and puzzles raised by his own model place us in a
better or worse position. Instead of a true model, we must look for a
fruitful one. But fruitful for whom, for what purpose? Models of
discovery, or models of persuasion? Recognition of the different
viewpoints from which law may be approached, and the desire to
give them all a place in the sun, so to speak, can be helpful. His
meta-model does help to' resolve some of the essentialist
perplexities. But I would submit that he dispenses too summarily
with the notion of truth. As long as those who propose new models
for law are to converse with the rest of mankind, they must link up
with them in some way through the body of shared beliefs. They
cannot expect that the mere acceptance of "subjectivity" as
presupposition will carry any weight towards furthering acceptance
of the more concrete proposals. As an element in furthering
knowledge, understanding, or acceptance of more "fruitful"
models of law, the observation that legal models are evaluative and
subjective plays, in a strict sense, an idle role; it is simply out of
gear. Whether we accept subjectivity or objectivity, we will still
want to make intelligent, rational appeals for acceptance of our
proposals. The appeals may be directed to the intrinsic beauty,
neatness, workability of a model, to its helpfulness for understanding, to social benefits resulting from general adoption of the model,
or to other pragmatic considerations. In any event, claims of a true
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or false nature will have to be made if the scheme is to carry weight
among those to whom it is proferred. Samek would not, I am sure,
deny this. But his stress on subjectivity, for all that it is liberating in
one sense, is unhelpful to the extent that it tends to obscure this last
consideration.
Randal R. Marlin
Department of Philosophy
Carleton University

Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence. By Albert A. Ehrenzweig. Leiden:
Sijthoff (Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, New York.) 1971. Pp. 395.
Behaviourist approaches to the humanities and the social sciences
are by no means uncommon, and we find in modern approaches to
criminology and penology constant reminders that criminals are sick
and that we do not pay enough attention to their mental condition,
although many countries have acquiesced by accepting the concept
of diminished responsibility or by making use of mental surgery as
part of their treatment of criminals. Now, Professor Ehrenweig has
come to the conclusion that jurisprudence and legal theory generally
may be approached from a Freudian standpoint - perhaps not as
surprising as one might feel in view of his Austrian background.
The main thrust of Ehrenzweig's argument is to be found in Part II
of the book, that "after the establishment of a common
denominator, legal philosophies can be identified and distinguished
only as a matter of semantic choice made on psychological
grounds" (p. 27). With respect, it is submitted that his own choice
of the terms 'philopsychy' and 'psychosophy' for what he describes
as a new type of jurisprudence is similarly somewhat of the same ilk
(pp. 145-6). Is not this all that one can say of a statement 'The
dualism of law and justice has permeated legal philosophy through
the millenia and has been at the root of such perennial political
problems as civil disobedience and criminal obedience. It reoccurs
in each of us with the division of Ego and Id" (pp. 37-8)?
As with so many other works on jurisprudence, the first part of
Dr. Ehrenweig's Psychoanlytic Jurisprudence is devoted to
summarizing and commenting upon the views of more traditional
legal phiolosphers, such as Kelsen, Hart, Ross, Savigny, Jhering,
G6ny, Ehrlich, Pound, the naturalists both old and new,
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positivism, realists, etc., and he regards the differences among them
as comparable to Don Quixote and the windmills (pp. 82-3). He is
aware that each of these philosophers and the schools they lead
concern themselves with gaps in the law and the need to fill them,
but he contends that to a very great extent any difference arising in
this connection does not stem from differing philosophies as from
differing value judgments (p. 85). He points out that at the centre of
modern juristic thought is the issue of the right to resist, but he
warns that in considering this problem we "must be particularly
careful in disengaging ourselves from the battles of semantics and
emotions" (p. 87). When considering this issue he compares the
views of Aquinas, Locke and Martin Luther King, considering the
message of the latter to be close to that of St. Thomas "Jurisprudentially, King's postulate merely asserts that a posited
rule is validly derived (concretized) from the apexnorm of the
Constitution only if this rule requires the lawmaker's own
obedience" (p. 90). Closely connected with the right to disobey is,
the learned author maintains, the counterpart of criminal obedience
or the duty to disobey and he refers in passing to the problem of the
post-Nazi German courts which have applied Radbruch's ungerrechtes Recht. The classic example of punishing such criminal
obedience is, of course, Nuremberg, but of this and the German
decisions he says, -far from proving the *existence' of such a
['higher'] law, they merely disguise the *positing' of retroactive,
legislative or judicial repeals of earlier law to the contrary, and
illustrate the fact that law is continuously made by value-directed
concretization" (p. 94). He suggests that if this type of approach is
adopted, then "criminal obedience, like civil disobedience, ceases
to be a battleground of schools of jurisprudence" (p. 95).
One of the problems which has given most delight to
jurisprudents and on which, as Austin has shown, personal
predilection plays so large a role, is that of 'what is lawT Dr.
Ehrenzweig examines this problem jointly with that of lawness',
and he does so in order to suggest that some of the claimed
differences between, for example, the common and civil law are not
as real as sometimes suggested. He uses as his final test the
approach of the expert on foreign law', maintaining that **scholars

should insist. . .that courts, lawyers, and their brethren everywhere
recognize and admit what we do when we 'apply' foreign rules,
namely that we interpret our own laws with our own techniques in
light of our own views on "lawness', or as it has been put so aptly,
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that we act as architects rather than photographers of the foreign
rules. Thus, despite many differences in mechanics, we might be
able to promote in this area a convergence between the two legal
orbits similar to that. . .of their concepts of law itself" (p. 141).
Part II of this work is devoted to an exposition of Ehrenzweig's
special approach in which he participates in what he calls the
struggle to liberate legal philosophy from a stalemate of two and a
half millenia (p. 146), doing so by way of psychosophy, -the study
of our minds, conscious and unconscious, as 'the science of
sciences'. Only if we accept such a study's limitation and its
promise can we expect guidance through the mirage of justice,
whether it appear as an absolute or as a relation, as a pretense of
reason, or as a tool of politics. On our path through this mirage of
justice, law will be our steady companion" (p. 147). The author's
seeking after the psychological bases of law leads him into a variety
of sideways and byways, and he is highly intrigued by Lorentz's
work on ethology and the importance of *instinct', for "legal
philosophers have at times spoken of an inborn instinct of justice
which in both humans and animals shares with other instincts the
mission of 'preserving the life of the race'. This view is strongly
supported by ethological research. Forced and voluntary submission
of many animals to authority may well be the first stage to the
recognition of a 'legally' accepted ranking as the origin of our sense
of justice since it contains instinctive aggression as well as fear, and
since it attributes to *each man his due'" (p. 156, italics in original).
Just as he is intrigued as much by lawness as law, Professor
Ehrenzweig prefers "justnesses' to 'justice', and these justnesses
cannot be measured "by such seemingly objective standards as
equality, reason or politics. We are left with the conclusion,
disconcerting to many, that we *merely praise or condemn in the
light of our own feelings"' (p. 157, c. Ayer). In asking us to accept
his approach, the learned author discusses a variety of issues and
refers, for example, to the drift from contract to status, so that
nowadays we find the workman or the insured person, for example,
seeking -protection against their 'contracts' from a status protected
by the state. The standard contract law of Israel (1964) offers a first
tentative solution" (p. 161). It would have been helpful if he had
expanded this comment. Instead, he merely provides a footnote
"See Hecht [an article in the Israel Law Review]. A pertinent
provision of the Soviet Russian Civil Code has been abandoned *as
no longer required'. Hazard [The Soviet Legal System] 316-3 17".
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Although the ordinary reader may feel that the author's recourse
to his psychosophic methods of analysis may be somewhat
confusing (see, e.g., the comments on conflict of laws at p. 164), it
cannot be denied that many of the points made by Dr. Ehrenzweig
are substantive. Even traditionalists will probably agree that "our
judgments of justness will and must always vary. But they respond
to an emotion which appears to be common to all of us, though its
range and intensity may vary according to each person's
psychological, or for that matter pathological, make-up. Only in
this sense can we understand those who claim that 'law is part of
man's essence' or a product of man's reason" (p. 183). Casual
reference to the way in which the law concerning obscentity,
abortion or homosexuality has changed confirms this, in fields
which are generally treated as falling within the realm of morality,
although Ehrenzweig in his discussion of the sense of justice
expressly abstains from distinguishing justice from morals or ethics,
for "the psychological structure of these concepts is the same for
our purposes" (ibid.). Non-psychosophists might also agree that
'the sense of justice determines law making in the same manner as
hunger determines eating and the sex drive secures procreation".
But would those of them who have lived through the conscious
.population stimulus drives' of post-1919 France and of Hitler,
agree that 'only science fiction could construct a human being who
would engage in the processes of eating and mating without being
induced to do so by his instinct, but who would do so because of a
sheer intellectual determination to continue his own life and that of
his race" (p. ibid.)? It may equally be questioned whether many
will go along with Ehrenzweig in his study of the sense of justice by
using "Freudian studies of the two to six-year-old and postFreudian speculations about the suckling and the toddler" (p. 193,
see also pp. 200-1, and on 'oedipal' and 'post-oedipal' crimes, pp.
211 et seqq.).
The width of the author's reading is impressive. It is therefore
surprising to find him ignoring here the views of Glanville
Williams, particularly when, in looking at problems of punishment,
he states that "we rarely admit, and hardly ever face, the
overwhelming impact of that 'unofficial' motor of much of our
criminal law, our retaliatory urge" (p. 208) - but then he has used
Fitzgerald's edition of Salmond. Hermann Mannheim is a writer in
this field whose work, even his Criminal Justice and Social
Reconstruction, does not figure in Ehrenzweig' s vade mecum.
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In so far as man's law abidingness is concerned, Dr. Ehrenzweig
points out that one can not generalize for the whole field of criminal
law, but must examine it almost crime by crime, and this is true also
from the point of view of the purpose of punishment. With regard to
what he calls post-oedipal crime, e.g., compliance with traffic
regulations, he maintains that by and large compliance depends
almost entirely on "a-moral' prescriptions and prohibitions" (p.
213), whereas with oedipal crimes there is an irrational desire for
retribution even though it may appear as deterrence, and it if
frequently used "unconsciously to counteract our own unconscious
temptations. . . .Much of our criminal procedure reflects our desire
for forgiveness. Anybody who has ever had a part in the
investigation of trial of a crime, or for that matter of any litigated
issue, knows of the relief it meant to him to receive or to witness a
confession in a criminal case or even an admission of a crucial fact
in a civil case. Consciously, to be sure, he will attribute his relief to
having fortified his conclusions. But subconsciously he has gained
freedom from his guilt, both its burden and its pleasure. The victim
has turned into an ally and a co-judge" (pp. 218-9). As a result,
society tends to reward the cooperative prisoner - perhaps the
Watergate series of 'plea bargaining' prosecutions constitutes the
finest example of this.
Dr. Ehrenzweig comments on the growing tendency towards
humanization even in connection with oedipal and some postoedipal crimes, but he warns as have so many before him that
- where retribution prevails. . .there looms danger. Here aggression, purportedly displaced, may return with a vengeance" (p.
220). He appears to be concerned not so much with the risk of a
return to lynch law (but see pp. 236-7), but with criticisms of the
substitutions for traditional forms of punishment that the state may
introduce, but, as with his reference to the Israel contract law, the
list of examples that he cites tells us nothing, unless the American
reader is more fully acquainted with both American and German
legislation than is the non-American. The trend to humanization has
of course shown itself in connection with the defence of insanity and
the gradual widening of the legal concept from that of the
McNaghten test to a more acceptable common-sense view, but as a
result "for some time now,. . lawyers and psychiatrists. . .have
engaged in a rather disgraceful game of pingpong, in which each
profession attempts to leave to the other the final responsibility.
Indeed, the new tests, while seeking to respond to medical
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knowledge and demands, have in turn betrayed the law. What the
law desires to know is whether or not to punish. Whenever society
purports to treat the offender's 'sanity' as decisive, it primarily
seeks to rationalize what is likely to become the result of irrational
reactions of aggresion or guilt" (p. 232). It is because of this
'irrationalism' that there is -'a compelling justification for retaining,
as society's mouthpiece and tool, the jury or other lay bodies which
are neither qualified nor compelled to articulate pseduo-rational
argument where there can be only irrational reaction" (ibid.), but he
does not feel the same need for retention of the jury in civil cases save perhaps for a "retaliatory law of torts which continues to resist
more rational schemes of loss distribution" (p. 275) - where
abolition "will immeasurably simplify. . .process and thus help to
protect the little man" (ibid.).
Enough has been said to indicate that there is much of interest and
value in Ehrenzweig's PsychoanalyticJurisprudence, while its title
may serve as an additional attraction to both jurist and student alike.
Its value to the potential reader, however, is likely to be lost if that
person looks at the last paragraph: "'Man has reached the moon, that
miniscule outpost of his own planet to which he must forever return.
He has taken a glance into his unconscious mind in a minscule flight
from his conscious to which he must forever return. And brightly,
and oh, so sadly, beyond Plato and Freud, a new *Humanistic'
science of 'Self-actualization' has set out to prepare us for higher
insights 'transpersonal, transhuman, centered in the cosmos rather
than in the human needs and interests.' It is that 'science' that as a
latter-day religion is to prepare man's higher nature. . .for being
fair and just,' - only to close a cycle that opened with Heraclitus'
divine cosmos 3000 years ago. But the cycle beckons again. Faith
and trust in absolute justice and truth again reveal their shallow
roots in our frailty, like our ancient dreams of conquering the
universe. Should another Plato seek to share with us his longing for
the Sun in the shadows of his Cave, another Freud will teach us the
wisdom of his resignation - in the eternal struggle between Eros
and Thanatos, between man's love of life and his yearning for
peace" (p. 281).

L. C. Green
Department of Political Science
University of Alberta
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As Julius Stone notes in his characteristically graceful Introduction,
Professor Ehrenzweig's book itself, in the sense implied in
Huizinga's words, had to be written; for in the climate of our
present age its theme struggled for articulation. It is, in fact, one of
only a handful of really comprehensive, "scope" works on Legal
Theory published since World War II, and in a very real sense one
of the important legal studies of our era.
Professor Ehrenzweig's book has a double purpose, and that fact,
it must be admitted, in some respects adds to the difficulties in its
comprehension. As the product of twenty-five years of teaching
Legal Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, it is,
of necessity perhaps for teaching purposes, a survey or compendium
in which the main "schools" of Justice and Jurisprudence, from
Plato to the present day, are identified and analysed; and in which
the main alternative definitions of Law and the main alternative and
sometimes competing theories of the "ends" or purposes of Law
are classified comparatively through space and time. The author, a
product of the rich Viennese cultural heritage, began his legal
studies and entered the legal profession in the troubled Austria of
the between-the-two-Wars era. The personal political tragedy that
brought Professor Ehrenzweig's flight to England, and ultimately to
the United States, provided him with the need, and the occasion, of
acquiring a second legal education, with the result that he became
the master of the two main World legal systems - the Continental
European Civil Law and the Anglo-Saxon Common Law. One
thinks, in this regard, of the extraordinary enrichment, provided by
the accidents of history, to the Anglo-Saxon Common Law legal
theory in the middle and late 1930s. For our system was then in the
comparative doldrums after the Americans Legal Realist impulse
had begun to peter out, and the North American Sociological School
of Jurisprudence's teachings had become so largely accepted; and
Man's Inhumanity to Man and the forced emigration of so many
distinctive legal thinkers from Hitler's Germany and Hitlerthreatened Central Europe provided a new and rich source of
hitherto largely "alien" legal ideas.
Professor Ehrenweig's study, as a survey or compendium work
on Jurisprudence, bears comparison to similar monumental studies
- by Julius Stone (the massive trilogy: Legal Systems and
Lawyers' Reasoning (1964); Human Law and Human Justice
(1965); Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966)); by
Wolfgang Friedmann (Legal Theory, 5th ed., 1967); and by Alf
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Ross, (On Law and Justice [1959]). But Professor Ehrenzweig is
not as wide-ranging and thorough in his eclecticism as Julius Stone;
nor as felicitous in presentation and styling as Wolfgang Friedmann.
He is, indeed, rather closer, in design and the fixing of his
immediate scientific objectives, to Alf Ross. For where, with both
Stone and Friedmann, the author's own personal legal philosophy
is, in Cardozo's sense, "interstitial", or at least secondary to the
main objective of critically analysing and comparing through space
and time the main legal systems, with Ehrenzweig the author's own
personalised approach to law becomes almost a contrapuntal theme
to his survey outline. Where Stone and Friedmann and Ross, in this
sense, are clearly committed, with varying degrees of emphasis and
enthusiasm, to the sociological approach to Law - Stone more
rigorously empirical and social scientific in orientation, in the North
American tradition flowing from Roscoe Pound; and Friedmann and
Ross seemingly a little more historically relativist in the Continental
European tradition associated with Radbruch and Max Weber Ehrenzweig commits himself to what must be described as a special
value-oriented approach to law. Ehrenzweig's approach is, indeed,
an essentially intuitive, ultimately aesthetic assessment of law and
its social functions and social purposes. This, the prescriptive as
distinct from the purely descriptive part of Ehrenzweig's study, will
be the most challenging, and the most difficult, for the legal reader
who is not himself trained also in advanced psychology. For these
parts of the Ehrenzweig study borrow heavily from the works of
Freud and Jung, with whom Ehrenzweig and his brother Anton, a
specialist in the psycho-analytic approach to Art appreciation, were
familiar from their own past associations with the cultivated
intellectual milieu of the Viennese literary haut-monde of the
pre-World War II era.
I cannot say that this part of Professor Ehrenzweig's work is
always clearly presented. His tendency to coin new words or
phrases the better to communicate his concepts - "beautness",
"psychosophy", or "psychophily" - may baffle and frustrate
some readers. But the importance of the Ehrenzweig approach,
here, is the attempt to break out of the confines of the endless
Natural Law
jurisprudential debate over the Positivism dichotomy; to find some ways of escape from the seemingly
"give-it-up" imperatives of academic legal relativism, in a crisis
period in the Western World perhaps increasingly comparable to
that Ehrenzweig himself experienced in Hitler's Europe years ago.
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The particular schools of Natural Law, whose postulated eternal
verities may provide comfort and assurance for some, turn too
easily into dogma with conformity thereto enjoined in the interests
of political intolerance. On the other hand, concepts such as
"Natural Law with a changing content", or Radbruch's search, in
the post-World-War II atonement, for limiting principles as to what
must be, in all "civilised legal systems", a statutory wrong and
hence a "non-law", - tend, from the strictly jurisprudential
viewpoint, to appear either purely vacuous or else hopelessly
subjective. Ehrenzweig's frankly psychological, aesthetics-oriented
quest for "super-eminent" legal principles common to all civilized
legal systems -

a sort of national law-based jus cogens, new jus

gentium - is at least an interesting new attempt at devising ordering
legal concepts of human dignity in an era of widespread ideological
conflict and diversity and of philosophical pluralism.
Edward McWhinney
Department of Government
Simon Fraser University

Insanity Defense. By Richard Arens. New York: Philosophical
Library. 1974. Pp. 328. Price $12.50.
Legal insanity seems to be a highly specialized subject. Many
lawyers do not feel that they have -

or should have -

anything to

do with it, just as many psychiatrists feel that they do not want to
have any part of forensic psychiatry. In reality, however, the
insanity defense constitutes an important problem closely related to
fundamental issues of both law and science. There is a science of
jurisprudence and there is a scientific core of clinical psychiatry,
although this latter is often obscured by extravagant speculations
and deep-sounding but actually superficial clich6s and assertions.
Moreover the insanity defense is a paradigm for the understanding
of the relations between law, psychiatry and society.
After many centuries of search and research man found a way to
cope more or less successfully with antisocial or criminal behavior.
The result was the establishment of criminal law. This has as its
foundation the concept of responsibility, formulated and codified in
various but always juridical terms. Then the psychiatrist enters and
draws conclusions about responsibility not on legal but on clinical
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medical grounds. How to incorporate this is not merely a matter of
an addition to the periphery of the law, but of something that
touches its very foundation. Hence the importance of the insanity
defense and the justification for evaluating Richard Arens' book
Insanity Defense not in a narrow frame but with consideration of the
broader social-historical picture.
Professor G. V. V. Nicholls, in the December 1973 issue of this
Journal, made the timely observation that all civilized systems of
law have two objectives: certainty and flexibility. Flexibility,
desirable and essential, as it is, can exist only if the firm foundation
of certainly is untarnished. "Everyone should know in advance",
Professor Nicholls adds, "or be able to discover, how the law will
affect him if he acts or fails to act in a given way." This certainty is
lacking in the United States of today to an extraordinary degree.
Wide sections of the population have lost all faith in law and law
enforcement. Serious crimes committed by those of high standing,
such as perjury, bribery, destruction of evidence, even physical
breaking-in into private or public places, have remained in a
twilight of half settlement or no settlement at all. This is not
flexibility; it is rigidity of privilege. And it has a far-reaching effect
on our whole society.
For several years it has been sufficiently known that the now
ex-president of the United States was guilty of legally forbidden acts
and omissions of acts. Thousands of people with much less
evidence against them are confined in jails. Yet again and again
representative politicians, journalists and lawyers have stated that in
the absence of formalized proceedings there can be no "certainty"
about the presence and extent of the ex-president's guilt. They have
complained that they felt uncertain about it. I am reminded of the
man who consulted a psychiatrist because be was so "uncertain"
about whether his wife was faithful to him or not. Once he called the
psychiatrist and told him that he had seen his wife in the evening
walking with a man on the street. He followed the pair to a hotel and
looked through the keyhole into the room they were in. "I could see
my wife all nude" he told the psychiatrist," and then I saw the man
all undressed, too. But then they turned off the light - and now I
have that uncertainty again." When the ex-president got a complete
pardon the light was turned off. What German jurists call the
Rechtsbewusstsein, the sense of justice of the people, was violated.
The very concept of responsibility was put in doubt.
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With regard to certainty of and trust in the judicial process the
insanity defense is one of the most sensitive and vulnerable areas.
That is understandable, but by no means necessary. Psychiatry and
the law can work together perfectly well. Even for such a difficult
subject as the psychological harm done by racial segregation in
schools 1 was able, by scientific, clinical psychiatric testimony in a
court in Delaware, to lay the scientific foundation for the later
historical desegregation decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. 1
But in recent years the judicial-psychiatric process has been
vitiated by tendencies in the law to abandon strict adherence to due
process and by tendencies in psychiatry to neglect strictly scientific
principles. Something close to the Watergate spirit has gradually
invaded the field. A prime example is the case of Ezra Pound, a
brilliant poet and critic, evidently guilty of a political offense, who
was declared insane and confined in an institution on the basis of a
2
totally unscientific psychiatric report.
The frequent lack of equality before the law in United States
justice is matched -

or rather surpassed -

by inequality in

psychiatry, both in diagnosis and in treatment. In civil practice the
rich man is apt to be treated as neurotic, whereas the poor man is
labelled psychotic. But when a crime is committed the situation is
reversed: the rich man is exculpated as psychotic, while the poor
man is dealt with and punished as just neurotic. These differences
are evident not only in the results of clinical examinations and
observations, but also in the alleged more neutral results of
psycho-diagnostic tests.
In recent years this situation has become enormously exacerbated. To give concrete examples: I happen to be a pupil of Emil
Kraepelin, the father of modern clinical psychiatry, who first
described the mental disease dementia praecox, which Bleuler later
named schizophrenia, its present designation. Having practiced
psychiatry for over fifty years in clinics, hospitals, universities,
institutions and private practice, I should by now know the
symptoms of schizophrenia. But suppose I testify in court that a
young man suffers from this disease in its most serious form.I may
find myself confronted in court by two psychiatrists who testify that
this young man does not have any mental disease at all; he may at
1. F. Wertham, Nine Men Speak to You, The Nation, June 12, 1954.

2. See the full report in F. Wertham, The Road to Rapallo, American Journal of
Psychotherapy, October, 1949.
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times be a little nervous, but that is all. Or assume that I testify for
an old lady over eighty years of age. After the most careful
examination I find her to be perfectly normal. There is some
difficulty with immediate retention, as is compatible with her age,
but her memory in general is intact, she is conversant with current
events, takes good care of herself and handles her finances sensibly.
Some relatives wish to contest her will and have her declared
insane. So two psychiatrists testify that she suffers from advanced
senile dementia and also from severe Parkinsonism.
Every experienced United States criminal lawyer knows that such
experiences are not unusual. Apologists for the status quo will say
that they are exceptional; but in my experience and to my
knowledge they are typical. And the psychiatrists involved are not
fly-by-night experts but are connected with leading universities and
major hospitals. What happens in the courtroom is of course merely
a symptom of more widespread, underlying frailties of the
judicial-psychiatric system.
Current publications of forensic psychiatry do not reflect
adequately this state of affairs and therefore they are not helpful in
bringing about the much needed reforms in this crime- and
violence-ridden period. What is lacking most is the study of facts,
procedures and well-observed cases with prolonged follow-up.
From psychiatric-legal publications on an exalted level of
abstraction and generalization one can hardly guess what happens in
actual life in and outside the courtroom and in and outside
psychiatric institutions. In this general situation Richard Arens'
book Insanity Defense is important. It tells us what actually does
happen in the courts, in the hospitals, in the press, in the political
wings.
The book is an account of an interesting research project financed
by public and private funds. An in-depth study was made of
individual cases with an insanity aspect after the introduction of
Judge Bazelon's Durham rule by the Court of Appeals in
Washington, D.C. (The Durham rule specifies that an accused is
not legally responsible if his criminal act was the product of mental
disease or defect.) The investigation covers the years from 1959 to
1963. The author is Professor of Law at Temple University in
Philadelphia. A leading scholar in legal-psychiatric studies, he has a
real understanding of the politico-social aspects of forensic
psychiatry, as shown for example by his critical discussion of the
book The Crime Of Punishment by Dr. K. Menninger in the
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University of Toronto Law Review in 1971. He was trial counsel in
most of the cases that are discussed, some in great detail, in this
book.
St. Elizabeth Hospital, where many of the insanity determinations in these cases were made, is one of the best-known psychiatric
hospitals in the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals in
Washington is one of the highest courts. That increases the
importance of this study. But it is even more significant inasmuch as
it reflects what generally happens in the rest of the country in
applied forensic psychiatry. The book has an even wider appeal than
this. As Harold Lasswell, professor of law and political science at
his introductory essay, what is at
Yale University, points out in'
stake is nothing less than the "denial of human rights". And indeed
the book demonstrates that psychiatrists are given - or have taken
- a great deal of unchecked power and that the psychiatric
determinations of competence to stand trial and of responsibility are
often not based on psychiatry but rest on other extraneous
considerations. This is true not only of the public psychiatric
hospital but of private psychiatrists as well. These determinations
affect a person's whole life. Needless to say, the poor and racially
discriminated against are especially exposed.
There are lessons in the fact that the injustices and questionable
practices, professional and organizational, documented in this book
have been and still are accepted. An interesting part of the research
is made up of interviews by project staff members of public and
private psychiatrists active in criminal cases. It emerged that they
had a strong tendency to allot to themselves in criminal cases the
right to extra-diagnostic judgements. Some of the psychiatric and
court decisions made in the wake of the Durham rule are noteworthy
in this respect. For example, drug addicts, disturbed epileptics,
serious sex offenders and persons with delusional and hallucinatory
experiences were declared "without mental disease or defect" or
even as "'mentally healthy". Surely this justifies Professor
Lasswell's judgement about -'human rights". These arbitrary
decisions interfere with both the rights of the individual and the
protection of society. The attitude about irrational violence is
typical. Confronted in court with the evidence that a defendant had
attempted to throw his little baby into a burning fire and was
prevented only by physical force from doing so, a psychiatrist
testified: "I don't think it amounts to mental illness" and went on to
hold forth on people "displacing their hostility".
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The Durham rule has now been superseded by the Brawner
doctrine which Arens discusses in the epilogue to the book.
Durham, although it had some defects, embodied "essential
democratic aspirations". The Brawner rule, from a progressive and
humanitarian as well as scientific point of view, represents a
definite regression. It is based on the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code. Of it it can be truly said with Horace: Parturiunt
montes nascetur ridiculus mus. It is not, as is claimed, an
improvement over the M'Naghten rule. For instance, it substitutes
-substantial capacity" for -capacity", or "to appreciate-, for -to
know", as if that would clarify anything. 3 It is based on no concrete
case studies, much less clinical ones. It has, as Professor Arens
points out, -'turned the clock back". This is a serious matter, for all
but one of the federal appeals courts have now adopted the basic
features of the American Law Institute rule. Devised by academic
bureaucrats, the Brawner rule opens the door to a kind of Watergate
psychiatry, where responsibility is arbitrarily assigned.
Arens disposes of the old idea that there is a communication
breakdown between psychiatrists and attorneys. As Heine said long
ago, when they do the wrong thing they understand each other only
too well. Insanity Defense represents a blending of strictly judicial
thinking, progressive social orientation, and respect for clinical
science. It is a landmark in forensic psychiatry and humanistic
jurisprudence.
Fredric Wertham
Kempton
Pennsylvania
3. The president of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law told a
Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary that the addition of
the term -'substantial" facilitates the presentation of psychiatric data. This is
confusion twice confounded.
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Members Of ParliamentAnd Conflict Of Interest. Ottawa, 1973.
Information Canada.
This volume was published as a -Green Paper" by The Honourable
Allan J. MacEachen, President of the Privy Council, in July of
1973. Its author is presumably an anonymous public servant. In
view of the widespread interest arising out of the well publicized
Watergate Story the subject of conflict of interest as it applies to
elected members is of considerable interest. The book discusses the
present state of the Canadian law and contains guidelines and
proposals for changes and a draft of the "Independence of
Parliament Act". It also includes an appendix of proposed Standing
Orders of Parliament to deal with the subject, and another appendix
setting out existing Canadian legislation on the subject.
The Green Paper has been referred to the House of Commons
Committee on Privileges and Elections together with the question of
conflicts of interest as applied to the Members of the Federal
Cabinet. This latter subject seems to be one of more immediate and
paramount urgency. Members of Parliament do. themselves, have
some influence on public affairs but they do not, as such, have
executive powers, they do not make contracts for the Crown and
they do not administer public funds. The occasions of conflict are
minimal in their case as compared to the possibilities of conflict that
arise out of holding a position in the Government itself. The booklet
calls attention to the different attitudes that have been taken in the
United Kingdom and the United States. The British have tended to
rely on a minimum of written rules and on parliamentary tradition.
The American Congress, on the other hand, has opted for a more
codified approach to conflicts of interest. Typically the Canadian
Green Paper's recommendations seem to lie between the two. I
would recommend the British approach.
The difficulty of detailed codes is that the possibilities of conflicts
of interest in the changing economic patterns are so varied and
innumerable that there is no codification that can possibly be
devised to cover all eventualities adequately. This is something like
the old problem of whether courses in legal ethics are really of any
assistance in upholding standards of the legal profession. One
wonders, for example, how many of the lawyers involved in
Watergate took at their law school's courses in legal ethics. It might
be better just to adopt or adapt some of the excellent definitions of
conflict of interest set out in the rules of equity developed in the
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British courts. What could be neater than the following: "A trustee
must not in any way make use of trust property or his position as
trustee for his own interest or private advantage." And again, "A
trustee must not intentionally place himself in a position in which
his interest may conflict with his duty. He must not, therefore, enter
into engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest
which conflicts or may conflict with the interests of those whom he
is bound to protect". (Halsbury Laws of England vol. 14, 3rd ed.
and vol. 38, 3rd ed. 956; Aberdeen Rly. Co. v. Blackie Brothers
(1854), 1 MacQ. 461, per Lord Cranworth. Regal v. Gulliver
[1940]. 1 All E.R. 378, per Lord Sankey). Another problem that
arises is how are the rules to be enforced; throught the courts or by
Parliamentary action? It has been stated that Members of Parliament
cannot be relied on to check the misdeeds of their own colleagues.
On the other hand, it may be that Parliamentarians under our
adversary system could be trusted to deal intelligently, fairly, and
with a great deal of insight with these matters. Reliance on
Parliament itself to enforce the rules as to conflicts of interest seems
to have worked well in Britain. Of course, where the matters are
clearly criminal in nature, the courts are the appropriate tribunals.
I hope that lawyers and students will study this volume and give
the benefit of their views on these matters to the committee which
will be responsible for recommending necessary changes in the law.
The fact remains that the trust of the people in their elected members
is essential to a soumd democracy. The pressure on Members of
Parliament from varied special interests is undoubtedly a real one.
In any proposed changes of the law there should be full disclosure of
any potential conflicts of interest and full revelation of all financial
interests of Members. Those elected to Parliament should not
complain that their right to privacy is invaded if they have to
disclose details of their financial position and interests. This should
be part of the price of seeking to represent the people of Canada.
Andrew Brewin
House of Commons
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Principlesof InternationalLaw Concerning FriendlyRelations and
Cooperation. Edited by Milan Sahovik. Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, New
York, 1973. Pp. 450.
Milan Bartos of the University of Belgrade, together with his
colleague Milos Radojkovic, was probably the first academic
international lawyer who put forward the contention that friendly
coexistence constituted a fundamental principle of international
law, and as a result friendly relations appeared on the agenda of the
47th Conference of the International Law Association held in
Dubrovnik in 1956 (p. 11, n. 4). Since then there has been a
widening recognition of the legal character of this concept
culminating in the adoption of the Declaration of the Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States, by the 25th commemorative session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1970. In view of this historic
background it is perhaps not surprising that the present volume of
essays on the Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation should have been produced by a group
of Yugoslav scholars working under the auspices of the Belgrade
Institute of International Politics and Economics.
Broadly speaking, these legal principles are nothing but the
Panch Shila of the old days of the Sino-Indian honeymoon spelled
out in legal terminology, or the principles of the United Nations
Charter expressed in a more traditional view of sovereign rights
slightly adapted to bring it up to date. Apart from the general
editor's own contribution on codification of the principles in
question, the papers are devoted to prohibition of the threat or use of
force, pacific settlement of international disputes, sovereign
equality, non-intervention in internal affairs, the duty to cooperate
in accordance with the Charter, equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, and the duty to carry out the obligations flowing from
the Charter in good faith. In view of the recent debate at the Caracas
Conference on the Law of the Sea where it became apparent that
voting would only emphasize differences, it is interesting to note
that the General Assembly's Special Committee charged with
codification of these Principles, aware of the conflict between the
older western democracies and the underdeveloped states and the
Soviet group, agreed to vote in accordance with existing rules of
procedure only when 'consensus' could not be reached (p. 11).
According to Dr. Sahovic, in the drafting it soon appeared that the
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real conflicts were not between the ideologically opposed members
of the United Nations, but between the small and the large
countries, with states appearing "'to be more sensitive to the
preservation of their independence than to political considerations,
so that in the course of the elaboration of the legal principles of
coexistence the specific manifestations of bloc disintegration took
place", with the Declaration formulated as a compromise (p. 12),
and receiving universal acceptance.
Perhaps the most controversial principle established by the
Declaration - for the principle to cooperate with one another in
accordance with the terms of the Charter is but one aspect of the
principle to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under the
Charter - is that of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
which is the subject of Dr. Olga Sukovic's paper. As she points out,
this principle was not approved until the final meeting of the Special
Committee, for "there was no agreement among members. . .on
the legal nature, subjects and concepts of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples. Difficulties also arose over
defining the scope of this principle as distinct from that of the other
principles..."(p. 323). The final formulation of the principle
was clearly a compromise, and despite the unanimity with which the
Declaration, with this as. one of its parts, was accepted by the
General Assembly there is still controversy as to the extent to which
it has become a recognised principle of international law. All Dr.
Sukovic says is that "the compromise formulation represents a step
in the direction of affirming this principle as a rule of contemporary
international law" (p. 324). The learned author acknowledges the
controversy that still exists as to the legal content of this so-called
principle of law, even pointing out that some Yugoslav writers
regard it as a politico-moral postulate, but she herself takes the line
that the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples is a clear assertion of its legal nature. She
dismisses the views of those who question the legal validity of
General Assembly declarations and sides with those, particularly
the socialist and non-aligned countries, who define selfdetermination "as equal rights of all peoples" (p. 329).
Nevertheless it is interesting to see that, unlike so many of those
who proclaim that the right of self-determination is one of the basic
principles of the Charter, Dr. Sukovic admits that "itis not possible
to draw unconditional and unequivocal conclusion on this
principle's binding nature from where the Charter refers to the
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principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"
(p. 336).
Enough has been said of this one paper to indicate the interesting
and reasonably balanced way in which its arguments have been
presented. The same is true of all the contributions. In addition to
the assessments of each principle put forward by the individual
contributor, the volume provides an excellent survey of the work of
the United Nations committees that were involved in this problem
and the way in which the Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation were evolved and
ultimately formulated.
L. C. Green
Department of Political Science
University of Alberta

The Modern Law of Treaties. By T. 0. Elias. Leiden: Sijthoff.
(Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.) 1974. Pp. 272.
Despite its title, this work by Chief Justice Elias deals entirely with
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. He has called it The
Modern Law of Treaties because he believes the Vienna Convention
"represents the new law of treaties" (Preface p. 7). To the extent
that the Convention, though not yet in force, constitutes most of the
corpus of contemporary law about treaties, his emphasis is
appropriate but his title is misleading. The reader should beware not
to expect a treatise on the whole of the law of treaties. As an
exposition of the Convention , the author claims "this is the first
systematic and the most detailed study of the subject by an
'insider' and he hopes it will become a vademecum and a work of
reference (Preface p. 8). In making this claim, he furnishes criteria
for its review.
As an insider, the author is amply qualified to undertake such a
study. He was elected to the U.N. International Law Commission
soon after that body began work on the law of treaties and later
became its General Rapporteur at two important drafting sessions.
When the international conference was convened in Vienna, the
author was elected Chairman of the Committee of the Whole
Conference for both sessions and also served as chairman of the
Afro-Asian Group of representatives.
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The author's claim that his study is systematic is certainly true of
his approach to the Convention. The substance of the Convention is
organized into fifteen chapters, covering conclusion of treaties,
observance and application of treaties inter partes and towards third
states, interpretation, amendment and modification of treaties,
grounds for and consequences of termination, suspension and
invalidity of treaties, jus cogens, settlement of treaty disputes and
the functions of depositing, correcting and registering treaties. His
coverage of the Convention is complete even to the extent of
pointing out what matters were omitted from it, such as application
of treaties to individuals, state succession to treaties, the effect of
hostilities on treaties and most-favoured-nation clauses (p. 17). But
his claim to provide a useful work of reference would be
substantiated more convincingly if his study covered the entire
range of problems.
The Convention throughout avoids dealing with the consequences
of the breach of one of its rules or of another treaty subject to its
rules. This omission was deliberately made as a result of the
conventional distinction between the law of treaties and the law of
state responsibility. It would be a severe deficiency in the
Convention if the International Law Commission had not already
taken the whole subject of state responsibility under separate study.
This justification is also adequate for the author's similar omission
from his study of the modern law of treaties. But the same excuse
cannot be made for his failure to discuss the relationship between
treaty law, both under the Vienna Convention and the Convention
itself qua treaty, and customary law, for instance with respect to
non-signatories and other third parties.
The author's claim to be systematic is less true of his exposition
of the Convention. It may be questioned whether the "most detailed
study" is detailed enough. The historical context of the
Convention's articles is quite sufficiently developed from the
travaux proparatories. The textual analysis of the Convention is
well done. There is some useful elucidation of its likely implications
in certain areas: for instance, the interpretation of treaties (Chap.
V), the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus (Chap. VIII), and, in
particular, the invalidity of treaties and its consequences, to which
more than one quarter of the book is devoted. Some suggestions are
also ventured about its likely effects, especially where the
International Court of Justice has already passed comment, as in the
Namibia Case (pp. 117-118) and the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
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(pp. 122-125). But a deeper and thus more detailed explication of
the consequences of the Convention for future treaty parties could
have been made. Given the author's inside experience, much more
of his "own personal views and assessment of the rules and
principles as finally adopted" (Preface p. 8) would have been of
special value.
Furthermore, to be a work of reference much more extensive
referencing, whether as footnotes or appendices, is necessary. The
travaux prdparatoires of the Convention are just as valuable a
resource for aiding its future interpretation and application as for
elucidating its history. Indeed the author favourably considers the
utility of travaux prdparatoires for interpretative purposes in
discussing the Convention's own rules regarding interpretation in
his study (pp. 79-84). Many more footnote references to this
material for this purpose could most usefully have been made. The
author has appended the text of the Convention and provided a
handy bibliography on treaty law in the English language. The
inclusion, however, of just five non-English language references
amongst the English ones is an inadequate representation of such
sources. There is also a table of fifty selected cases involving treaty
law, most of which appear to be discussed in the text, but to which
no page references are given.
This book reads best as an expression of the common
understanding about the Convention shared by the insiders. Such a
commentary much assists the reader's comprehension of the
Convention. Regretably, the distinguished author had the opportunity to provide, and led the reader to expect, rather more.
Hugh M. Kindred
Dalhousie Law School

InternationalConcern With Human Rights. By Moses Moskowitz.
Leiden: Sijthoff (Oceana: Dobbs Ferry, New York.) 1974. Pp. ix
and 239. Price: Dfl. 45: $20.00.
Dr. Moskowitz opens his analysis of InternationalConcern with
Human Rights by pointing out that what is needed today is not
repeated hortatory declarations afirming belief in and acceptance of
human rights, but effective action on concrete issues especially
before the United Nations, and he calls for the transformation of
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"international concern with human rights. . .from an arresting
metaphor into a systematic theory" (p.v.), for he is convinced that
"the present concept of international concern with human rights
cannot become an advocacy that seizes the minds of men" (p.vi).
The author opens with a survey of what the United Nations has
done so far and, using the example of the Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia, points out that ideological differences as to the
dignity of man and the significance and sanctity of sovereignty
prevent progress on the subject of human rights: "It is very difficult
to delimit the area of operation in which the power of the state may
be exercised to safeguard the peace and security of the realm; it is
infinitely more difficult to force governments into molds of
appropriate behaviour and to prescribe how nations may act out
their internal conflicts, their collective will and purpose. Ideas that
are the product of one civilization will not always galvanize another
society unless they are reinterpreted in terms of that society's own
traditions and impulses" (p. 62 also p. 117). The fundamental
problem is, therefore, to reconcile "different scales of values and to
do it without bypassing the answers for a sweeping message of
faith" (p. 63). His analysis of the United Nations in operation
illustrates the difficulty and frustration inherent in a situation when
the international organization, which after all is only the mouthpiece
of the majority of its members, operates both as referee and
partisan. As an instance he cites the facility with which the majority
in that body have condemned Israel for war crimes and offences
against humanity, completing ignoring the fact that these are
technical terms which require judicial determination (pp. 82-4).
Moreover, much of the apparent concern with human rights, at least
since 1960, has been as an offshoot of the struggle against
colonialism which tends to ensure that only those matters disliked
by the Soviet bloc and the majority of the newly independent states
will really get an airing, and any criticism of action by those states is
likely to be met with the argument that it is an unwarranted
intervention in domestic affairs and thus outside the competence of
the Organization (v. ch. VII).
While Dr. Moskowitz is of opinion that "the cause of
international human rights is not necessarily well served by the
multiplication of unrelated procedures and the creation of new
agencies and institutions", he maintains that "there is no question
that if international protection of human rights is to respond
concretely to the imperatives of the age, it must be institutionalized
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[for] in a world of organized power even virtue must be structured"
(p. 107), and he sees the International Covenants together with the
Optional Protocol as providing "the constitutional framework
within which the necessary pressures can be brought to bear on the
policies and actions of governments and within which procedures
can be evolved to deal with violations of human rights" (p. 108),
even though by themselves they are "a precarious scaffold to
support the hope of the future" (p. 110). He also draws attention to
the fundamental difficulty involved in assessing whether a state's
actions which abrogate or limit human rights are really demanded
by the needs of national emergency or security, for "there is no way
in which the international community can intervene, except by
invitation of the legally-constituted authorities, to arbitrate between
patriotism and treason. The old adage that treason is a capital crime
unless it succeeds, in which case it becomes an act of heroic
patriotism, is very much to the point" ( p. 120). Moreover, as was
clear from the attitude of the Council of Europe to the Papadopolous
regime in Greece, intervention in these circumstances is often
nothing but a demand that the established authority liquidate itself
(pp. 124-8).
Much has been made in recent years of the need to establish a
proper balance between the haves and the have-nots with efforts to
achieve common standards of economic enjoyment, of which
perhaps some of the discussions relating to the high seas as the
natural heritage of mankind are exemplary. To some extent the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
Economic Charter would appear to achieve this, but it must be
borne in mind that "never in the history of the United Nations has a
government of a State Member been criticized, let along censured,
for failure to provide an adequate standard of living, or the desired
social services, for its people, neither in developed nor developing
countries" (p. 132), and there is nothing to suggest that this is likely
to change.
As to the future, the learned author points out how important it is
to note that unrestricted enjoyment of all man's rights may well lead
to destruction of man's very existence in view of prospects of
over-population, pollution and ecological disaster, but he also
reminds us how easy it is for the developing nations to suggest "that
the developed countries were contriving a cunning and devastating
scheme to use the issue of environment as a means of imposing
controls on the population growth of the underdeveloped nations"
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(p. 141). Because of this 'crisis in civilization', "an organizing
principle and a source of positive values must be restored to the
public realm and the world given a unified vision of human
development capable of containing the irrational forces rampant
throughout creation and linking the hope for social change with the
values of freedom" (p. 147).
It is probable that no one will contradict the author's statement
that it is not the Charter that has failed the international community,
but, as U Thant stated, the international community that has failed
to live up to its obligations under the Charter (p. 161), and this is as
true of human rights as in any other field. On the other hand, while
approving the idealism which underlies it, one may be tempted to
question his statement: "There is no doubt that if a model of the
world could be constructed which would demonstrate the precise
cause and effect relationship between all the factors that enter into
the human condition, establish the exact point at which they
intersect, balance and evaluate the consequences of any shift in that
balance and otherwise assess the probable effects of any given
action, international concern with human rights would emerge as
the one approach to the problem of man which not only moves
nearest towards a predictable conclusion, but also brings harmony
between proximate goals and ultimate ends and maps the road
towards their attainment. There is no other approach that provides
the motivation, the discipline, the tolerance and the compassion
needed to deal with those problems than one which addresses itself
directly to the elemental cares and burdens of man everywhere and
which transcend all national boundaries and ideological divisions
that block the road to true cooperation for the common good. If it be
true that there is no 'scientific' solution to social problems, only a
system of values whose end is man can successfully bridge the gap
between his power to act and his power to foresee the consequences
of his actions. There is no other dimension of international relations
than concern with human rights that at once conveys the sense of
interrelatedness of all the vital issues of the times and steers the
world toward an international order capable of shouldering the
herculean tasks confronting mankind" (p. 158).
While Dr. Moskowitz may not have put forward any really
practical solution to make real the International Concern with
Human Rights, his book provides a useful account of the inherent
problems which militate against expectations of success from the
United Nations. On the other hand, it serves to emphasize that what
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is really needed for human rights to become realities is a
fundamental change in the nature of man and in the ideologies of the
states which both protect and endanger him.
L. C. Green
Department of Political Science
University of Alberta

